Was könnte 2024 bringen? RFE/RL Journalisten machen ihre Vorhersagen
ncooperate with Moscow, and Belarusian leaders will not stray far from their historical reliance on Moscow’s security umbrella. But Moscow’s setbacks in Ukraine could lead to a more balanced Belarusian foreign policy as the Lukashenka regime seeks to normalize relations with the West. This would involve steps to ease tensions with the West, foster dialogue with the European Union, and potentially pave the way for tentative economic cooperation. It should be noted that despite such goals, any substantial shift in Belarus’s external orientation will be rather half-hearted and, as always, subject to Russian authorization. However, 2024 will not see Belarus march headlong into the arms of Western states. The erosion of Russia’s international standing and the limitations on its capacity to pursue aggressive action, meanwhile, could coax the Belarusian regime into a more pragmatic foreign policy. Just as in the past, the possibility of expanded political advocacy for Belarus by the West will be modest and largely improvised, perpetuating the existing model of relations with Europe. The U.S. and EU will continue to be critical of Belarus’s human rights record, and cooperation will still be limited. Ultimately, a resolution to the struggle in Ukraine may ease some of the pressure on Minsk. If Russia ultimately concludes an agreement on Ukraine with Western nations, Belarus may have room to breathe and perhaps even aspire to economic normalization. regime seeks to normalize relations with the West. This
would involve steps to ease tensions with the West, foster dialogue with the European Union, and potentially pave the way for tentative economic cooperation. It should be noted that despite such goals, any substantial shift in Belarus’s external orientation will be rather half-hearted and, as always, subject to Russian authorization. However, 2024 will not see Belarus march headlong into the arms of Western states. The erosion of Russia’s international standing and the limitations on its capacity to pursue aggressive action, meanwhile, could coax the Belarusian regime into a more pragmatic foreign policy. Just as in the past, the possibility of expanded political advocacy for Belarus by the West will be modest and largely improvised, perpetuating the existing model of relations with Europe. The U.S. and EU will continue to be critical of Belarus’s human rights record, and cooperation will still be limited. Ultimately, a resolution to the struggle in Ukraine may ease some of the pressure on Minsk. If Russia ultimately concludes an agreement on Ukraine with Western nations, Belarus may have room to breathe and perhaps even aspire to economic normalization.
